The immigration judge had ruled that the Immigration and Naturalization Service failed to demonstrate the respondent’s removability because the crime for which he was convicted did not include physical contact with a child, which is an element contained in the federal criminal code’s definition of "sexual abuse of a child."  18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2246.  The provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 that added "sexual abuse of a minor" to the list of offenses that constitute aggravated felonies did not contain a definition of the term, nor did it include cross-references to other federal laws containing relevant definitions.

In reversing the IJ’s ruling, the BIA majority turned to other federal statutory sources addressing child abuse, specifically, 18 U.S.C. section 3509(a), which delineates the rights of child victims and child witnesses in the context of federal proceedings.  In that definition, physical contact is not included as a necessary element, and the BIA reasoned that adopting this broader definition is consistent with Congress’s intent to "provide in the [INA] a comprehensive scheme to cover crimes against children."  Adopting this less restrictive definition, the BIA held, will also better enable federal authorities to enforce immigration laws uniformly as they take into account the states’ varying statutes addressing sexual abuse of children.  The BIA vacated the IJ’s ruling and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.